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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply
Association, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
Keatan Williams
In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the United States
Supreme Court upheld FERC Order No. 745, which regulates the prices
that wholesale market operators pay for demand response bids. At issue
in the case was whether this regulation exceeded FERC’s wholesale
regulation authority under the Federal Power Act, thereby impinging on
retail markets under state regulation, and whether the pricing regulations
within the rule were chosen in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The
Court held Order No. 745 withstood both challenges.
I. INTRODUCTION
At issue in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric
Power Supply Association was the Electric Power Supply Association’s
(“EPSA”) challenge to whether the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) had the authority under the Federal Power Act
(“FPA”) to promulgate Rule No. 745 (“Rule”), which regulates the prices
that wholesale market operators pay for demand response bids. 1 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
vacated the Rule, holding that it “engage[d] in ‘direct regulation of the
retail market’” and, that “alternatively, . . . the Rule [was] arbitrary and
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.”2
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and upheld the
authority of the Rule using a three-step analysis.3 First, the Court held
that the practices regulated by the Rule “directly affect wholesale rates,”
and so are within FERC authority under the FPA. 4 Second, the Court
held that the Rule did not regulate retail sales and therefore complied
with the FPA. 5 Third, the Court held that vacating the Rule would
conflict with the core purposes of the FPA.6 Additionally, the Court held
that the Rule was not arbitrary and capricious in the manner that it
1.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n,
136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
2.
Id. at 772 (quoting Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 216, 223-25 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
3.
Id. at 773.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
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regulated the sales, because FERC “addressed the issue seriously and
carefully.” 7 The Court rendered a 6-2 verdict, with Justice Samuel A.
Alito abstaining.8 Justice Antonin G. Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence
Thomas, dissented, suggesting that the Rule should have failed all three
steps of the test and, additionally, was arbitrary and capricious.9 While
Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the law provides insightful dicta, for
now FERC is within its authority to regulate demand response
transactions in the energy market.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The FPA authorizes and places limits on FERC’s regulation of
the energy market. 10 Under the act, FERC may regulate “‘the sale of
electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,’ including both
wholesale electricity rates and any rule or practice ‘affecting’ such
rates.” 11 The language giving FERC authority to promulgate rules
affecting such rates has been interpreted in case law to limit FERC’s
authority to rules that “directly affect the whole sale rate.”12 Additionally,
FERC’s authority is limited by the prohibition that its rules may not
regulate retail electricity sales. 13 This provision does not, however,
prohibit FERC rules “just because [they] affect[]—even substantially—
the quantity or terms of retail sales.”14
The questions in this case apply these grants of authority
specifically to the practice of demand response competition. In the
current market, it is often beneficial to wholesale energy providers,
called wholesale market operators (“WMO”), to pay “load-serving
entities” (“LSE”) and other purchasers to use less power during peak
hours.15 On the supply side, WMOs take bids from energy providers and
then accept those bids starting at the lowest cost until the energy demand
is met.16 The highest bid amount accepted is then paid to all bidders.17
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 784.
Id. at 765
Id. at 784-89.
Id. at 766; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823d (2012).
FERC, 136 S Ct. at 766 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), 824e(a)

(2012)).
12.
Id. (quoting Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395,
403 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
13.
Id.; see 16 U.S.C. §824(b).
14.
FERC, 136 S Ct. at 776.
15.
Id. at 769-770.
16.
Id. at 770.
17.
Id.
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Alternatively, the WMOs can pay wholesale purchasers to use less
energy during peak hours, which allows the WMOs to accept lower bids
and save money overall. 18 Additionally, this scheme promotes lower
energy use and helps to prevent overloading the electrical grid.19 These
payments to buyers for not using electricity are called demand
response.20 WMOs, recognizing the potential for a more effective system,
started implementing demand response bids into their auctions around
2000 with permission from FERC.21
In 2005, Congress encouraged demand response in the Energy
Policy Act. 22 Then, in 2008, FERC issued Order No. 719, which
“require[d] wholesale market operators to receive demand response
bids . . . except when the state regulatory authority . . . bar[red] such
demand response participation.” 23 This order allowed WMOs to
compensate demand response providers however they chose.24 Lastly, in
2011, FERC issued Order No. 745, Demand Response Competition in
Organized Wholesale Energy Markets.25 This is the rule under review in
this case.
Rule 745 “requires that demand response providers . . . receive
as much for conserving energy as generators do for producing it.”26 This
requirement specified two conditions which would not apply. First, the
bidder must have “the capability to provide the service,” and secondly,
paying for the bid “must be cost-effective.”27 Additional language in the
Rule preserved states’ right to ban the practice under Order No. 719.28 In
promulgating the Rule, FERC rejected an alternative formula that would
have allowed WMOs to pay the equal price minus retail price to demand
response bidders.29

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see 16 U.S.C. § 2642 (2012).
FERC, 136 S. Ct. at 771; see 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1) (2015).
FERC, 136 S Ct. at 771.
Id.; see 18 C.R.F. § 35.28(g)(1)(v).
FERC, 136 S Ct. at 771.
Id.; see 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, ¶¶ 48-49 (Mar. 24, 2011).
FERC, 136 S. Ct. at 772.
Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Rule Has an Affect on Wholesale Markets
The Court used a three-step analysis to interpret the Federal
Power Act. The first step in the Court’s analysis was to determine
whether the Rule regulates the wholesale market or affects the rates of
those markets. 30 Affecting the rates means that the Rule “directly
affect[s] the wholesale rate.”31 Because the Rule focused on regulating a
program with the primary goal of reducing wholesale rates, the Court
held that it “directly affect[ed] wholesale prices” and it was “hard to
think of a practice that does so more.”32
B. The Rule Does Not Regulate Retail Sales
To fall within FERC’s authority under the FPA, the Rule must
also “not regulate retail electricity sales.” 33 This test on the limit of
FERC’s authority acknowledges that “transactions that occur on the
wholesale market have natural consequences at the retail level.” 34 The
Court thus framed the jurisdictional argument in terms of markets,
instead of sales, determining that the Rule focused “exclusively on the
wholesale market and govern[ed] exclusively that market’s rules.”35 To
come to this conclusion, the Court looked to FERC’s justification for the
regulation and found it to be based entirely on improving the wholesale
market.36
The Court directly addressed EPSA’s arguments on the
regulation of retail versus wholesale jurisdiction. EPSA first argued that
because large energy consumers purchase energy on the wholesale
market, the Rule effectively raises retail rates because the “opportunity to
make demand response bids in the wholesale market changes consumer’s
calculations.”37 For example, EPSA argued that if a factory could buy
electricity for ten dollars or be paid five dollars to not use electricity, by
sacrificing the opportunity to get paid for reducing use, the retail price
30.
Id. at 773.
31.
Id. at 774.
32.
Id. at 775. The dissent did not consider this test appropriate for
analysis under the FPA. Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33.
Id. at 775 (majority opinion).
34.
Id. at 776.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
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“effectively” rises from ten dollars to fifteen dollars. 38 Without any
specific citation, the Court held that their previous decisions “uniformly
speak about rates, for electricity and all else, in only their most prosaic,
garden-variety sense.” 39 Therefore, the Court rejected the argument of
the “effective” rate and held that “EPSA’s theoretical construction thus
runs head long into the real world.”40
ESPA next argued that FERC promulgated the Rule to
deliberately lure retail customers on to the wholesale market so that
fewer purchasers were under state authority. 41 The Court turned to its
previous history of the rule to refute this claim. 42 The Court reiterated
that FERC only played a role in this type of market at the request of the
WMOs and even when doing so, granted veto power to the states.43 The
Court rejected this argument without much discussion.
The dissent accepted and bolstered EPSA’s argument of
“effective” price by including a definition from Black’s Law Dictionary,
and using an analogy of airplane vouchers. 44 The majority gave this
argument no credit, considering it “convoluted.” 45 Additionally, the
dissent focused on purchasers instead of markets when analyzing
whether the Rule regulates retail sales.46 With this focus, the dissent held
that the Rule exceeds its authority because some of the companies
entering demand response bids are large consumers of electricity and not
re-sellers and therefore the rule is regulating retail sales.47 The majority
did not discuss this theory.
C. Invalidating the Rule Would Subvert the FPA
The Court further held that invalidating the Rule using EPSA’s
arguments would subvert the FPA.48 The Court reasoned that if FERC
was unable to regulate demand response at all, as the EPSA argued, then
the whole system of demand response bidding would cease to exist
because FERC could not have approved its implementation in the first

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 778.
Id.
Id. at 778-779.
Id. at 779.
Id.
Id. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 778 n.9 (majority opinion).
Id. at 785-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 786.
Id. at 780 (majority opinion).
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place. 49 If this were to occur, the Court reasoned, it would “flout the
FPA’s core objects” and “halt a process that so evidently enables [the
FPA objectives] of holding down prices and enhancing reliability in the
wholesale energy market.” 50 The dissent devoted the majority of its
opinion to addressing this reasoning, which it considered “alarmist
hyperbole.”51 The dissent believeed that, at most, invalidating the Rule
would “eliminate this particular flavor of FERC-regulated demand
response.”52
D. The Rule Passes the APA Standard
Lastly, EPSA challenged FERC’s decision of how to formulate
required prices under the Rule as “arbitrary and capricious” and therefore
in violation of the APA.53 EPSA argued that FERC arbitrarily chose to
require WMOs to compensate bidders at the price they would have paid
an energy provider bid instead of subtracting the retail price.54 The Court
relied heavily on agency deference and held that “[FERC] addressed
[the] issue seriously and carefully.”55
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court upheld Rule No. 745 with vigor, and in doing so,
promoted the use of demand response bidders to enable a more efficient
and reliable electricity market. The Court further established that in
complicated issues of state and federal energy regulation, it will continue
to differentiate by traditional definitions of markets and not get bogged
down in the complexities of the energy market.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 781-82.
Id. at 788 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 782 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 784.

